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FRAUD WITHOUT DECEIT: MARSHEL v.
AFW FABRIC CORP. AND GREEN v.
SANTA FE INDUSTRIES, INC.
Barbara Ann Banoff*
The Supreme Court has characterized private litigation
under rule 10b-51 as a "judicial oak which has grown from little
more than an acorn." That oak, with a few quickly cut back
exceptions, has been rooted in deception.3 Recently, however,
* Senior Fellow in Law, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1966, Radcliffe College; J.D.,
1973, University of Santa Clara School of Law. I would like to thank Victor Brudney,
Richard Danzig, Livingston Hall, David Herwitz, Duncan Kennedy, and Louis Loss
for their comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1976), was promulgated in 1942 by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the authority granted it by section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1970). Section 10(b) outlaws
the employment of "manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances" in contravention of Commission rules. Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
For the last 30 years, since Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D.
Pa. 1947), a judicially implied private right of action has furnished the courts with an
increasing number of occasions to explore the contours of the rule.
2. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
3. The exceptions have arisen in the context of derivative actions alleging that a
corporation trading in securities (either its own or those of another company) has been
deceived by its own directors and officers. Ordinarily, a corporation acts through its
agents and "knows" what the agents know, unless, for some reason, their knowledge
is not imputed. An allegation that a corporation has been defrauded by its own officers
thus raises squarely the knotty, quasi-theological question of how a fictional person is
deceived. One line of cases has answered that question in terms of "disclosure": a
corporation is deceived if the interested corporate agents fail to disclose the material
facts surrounding the transaction to disinterested members of the board of directors
or, if none exists, to the shareholders. This duty to disclose arises even if neither the
minority directors nor the shareholders have the voting power to stop the challenged
transaction. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972); Ruckle v. Roto
Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). But see O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.
1964) (a corporation is not deceived when the entire board knew the facts, even if all
the directors were interested).
A second line of cases however, has followed a "fairness" standard established in
Schoebaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
906 (1969). Schoenbaum held that if a corporation's board of directors is controlled
by another corporation or individual, and that controlling person induces an unfair
securities transaction between it and the controlled corporation, a derivative claim for
relief exists on behalf of the controlled corporation. This "fairness" standard was
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the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit created a new
branch which (if the metaphor will stand the strain) looks like
another tree entirely.
In two decisions handed down five days apart,4 the Second
followed in Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970). That court described
the standard as functionally equivalent to deception: the purpose of disclosure is to
permit unimpaired investment judgment, but a controlled corporation's investment
judgment is impaired by virtue of the control. The result of unfair self-dealing is,
therefore, the same as it would be if the corporation were "deceived" by a stranger.
See also Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
The broad Schoenbaum doctrine was hailed by some commentators as having
eliminated deception in a lOb-5 action. See Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act and Self Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332 (1969); Cox,
Fraud Is in the Eyes of the Beholder: Rule lOb-5's Application to Acts of Corporate
Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 674 (1975); Folk, Corporation Law Developments-1969, 56 VA. L. REV. 775 (1970); Patrick, Rule 10b-5, Equitable Fraud and
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: Another Step in the Continuing Development of Federal
CorporationLaw, 21 ALA. L. REV. 457 (1969); Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook:
The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. REv. 1103 (1969).
However, Schoenbaum's fairness doctrine was accompanied by an alternative
holding which had been urged by the SEC, as amicus, and which was framed in disclosure terms: the controlling shareholder had deceived the minority shareholders by
failing to disclose the facts of the transaction to them. This alternative holding was
seized by a subsequent panel in Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir. 1972) as
the "conclusion" of Schoenbaum.
In Popkin, a minority shareholder brought a derivative action challenging a
merger between his company and its controlling shareholder, alleging that the merger
ratios were grossly unfair and amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty by the controller.
The plaintiff stipulated that the proxy statement made full and fair disclosure of all
material facts, but argued that rule 10b-5 affords minority shareholders protection
against overreaching whether or not the facts are disclosed. The Popkin court disagreed, stating that Schoenbaum's emphasis on self-dealing had not eliminated nondisclosure as a key issue in rule 10b-5 cases, and holding that full disclosure defeated the
plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief. Id. at 720. Popkin's restriction of Schoenbaum
has been criticized, see Jacobs, The Role of Securities Exchange Act Rule l0b-5 in the
Regulation of CorporateManagement, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 27 (1973); Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule J0b-5 CorporateMismanagement Cases, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1007 (1973), and language in a subsequent opinion appeared to revive the
"fairness" doctrine. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); 63 CALIF. L. REV. 563 (1975). Nevertheless,
Popkin continued to be followed in the Second Circuit. See Note 20 infra.
4. Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), and Green v.
Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976). On October 12, 1976, the Supreme
Court granted the petition for certiorari in Marshel, vacated the decision and remanded for consideration of mootness. Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 97 S. Ct. 229
(1976). The merger enjoined in Marshel was actually called off on February 10, 1976,
three days before the Second Circuit decision was handed down. The court of appeals
was notified by letter of the merger's abortion, but did not consider its effect on the
motion for a preliminary injunction. Because Marshel has been followed in subsequent
cases, and was relied on in Green, the opinion continues to be important whether or
not the question of injunctive relief has been mooted. The Supreme Court granted the
Green petition for certiorari on October 4, 1976. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, Inc.,
97 S. Ct. 54 (1976).
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Circuit Court of Appeals eliminated deception as a necessary
ingredient in a rule 10b-5 action. The conduct assailed in both
opinions was "going private"-cashing out minority public
shareholders. In both cases the facts surrounding the challenged transactions were fully disclosed. Nevertheless, both
panels held that deception was not necessary to a 10b-5 claim;
a breach of fiduciary duty was sufficient.
As might be expected, the opinions have not passed unnoticed.' Petitions for rehearing en banc were denied because the
cases were of "such extraordinary importance" that the Supreme Court was certain to grant petitions for certiorari.' The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, asked to apply the Second
Circuit's opinions to an exchange-of-shares merger, stated that
"these two decisions cannot be read apart from the milieu of
'going private' merger transactions," and declined to "equate
a breach of fiduciary duty with fraud."' Other courts, however,
have either followed or felt it necessary to distinguish Green
and Marshel in cases not involving "going private." 8
5. Green is discussed in Dyer, An Essay on Federalismin PrivateActions Under
Rule lOb-5, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 7. Both Green and Marshel are the subjects of Rosenfeld, An Essay in Support of the Second Circuit's Decisions in Marshel v. AFW Fabric
Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111 (1976); Comment,
"Going Private"-The Insiders' Fiduciary Duty and Rule IOb-5: Is Fairness Requisite?, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 565 (1976); Comment, The Second CircuitAdopts a Business
Purpose Test for Going Private: Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe
Industries, Inc., 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1184 (1976); Note, Judicial Retrenchment Under
Rule lOb-5: An End to the Rule as Law?, 1976 DUKE L.J. 789; Comment, Federal
"Going Private" Standards:A New Direction for the Second Circuit, 45 FORDHAM L.
REV. 427 (1976); Comment, Going Private and Rule 10b-5: The Green and Marshel
Decisions, 47 Miss. L.J. 981 (1976); 89 HARv. L. REV. 191 (1976); 9 IND. L. REV. 1009

(1976).
6. 533 F.2d 1309, 1310 (2d Cir. 1976).
7. Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978, 985 (6th Cir.) petition for cert. filed,
45 U.S.L.W. 3103 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No. 76-5).
8. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976) (exchange-ofshares merger unfair to corporation gives derivative 10b-5 claim against executor of
controlling shareholder's estate, when executor grossly negligent in failing to recognize
the unfairness of the transfer; decision also rested on duty to disclose to minority
shareholder); Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., [Current
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,824 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 1977) (target
management's sales of shares to friendly purchaser, solely to defeat a proposed tender
offer with no proper corporate purpose, violates section 14(e)); Del Noce v. Delyar
Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,670 (S.D.N.Y. July
30, 1976) (Green distinguished in exchange of shares merger because there was "no
breach of the fiduciary duty to deal fairly" with shareholders); Nash v. Farmers New
World Life, 11975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,519 (S.D. Ohio
March 30, 1976) (exchange-of-shares merger did not violate 10b-5 because the exchange ratio was fair and the merger was not designed to serve solely the interests of
majority shareholders); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

4
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The phenomenon of "going private" has been amply discussed elsewhere.' This article does not reargue the question
whether "going private" ought to be prohibited, encouraged, or
substantively regulated. Rather, it examines Green and
Marshel to determine, first, whether the opinions are consistent with their own premises and, second, whether section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 can be properly interpreted to proscribe
"fraud" without deceit. The article concludes that the cases
have internal contradictions and that neither the statute nor
the rule applies to fully-disclosed breaches of fiduciary duty.
Smith, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (exercise of option to repurchase restricted shares without disclosing plans to go public; Green cited for proposition that,
even if restrictions on shares were legal, they would be invalid if exercised for a fraudulent purpose); Seigel v. Merrick, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,467 (S.D.N.Y. March 11, 1976) (corporate repurchase of shares at a premium to protect management control violates lOb-5).
9. Compare Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 VA. L. REV. 1019 (1975)
(freeze-outs should be prohibited in the absence of a compelling business purpose) with
Borden, Going Private-OldTort, New Tort, or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 987 (1974)
(going private at a fair price should be permitted except, perhaps, in close corporations). See also Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A ProposedAnalysis, 28 STAN.
L. REV. 487 (1976); O'Neal & Janke, Utilizing Rule lOb-5 for Remedying Squeeze-outs
or Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 16 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 327 (1975);
Solomon, Going Private: Business Practices,Legal Mechanics,Judicial Standardsand
Proposalsfor Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 141 (1975); Note, Going Private:An Analysis
of Federal and State Remedies, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 796 (1976); Note, Going Private,
84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975).
Nor has the discussion been confined to the law reviews. Former SEC Commissioner Sommer has forcefully expressed his view that "going private" transactions are
"serious, unfair, and sometimes disgraceful, a perversion of the whole process of public
financing," and urged imaginative application of rule 10b-5 to prevent breaches of
fiduciary duty. Address by SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., "Going Private":A
Lesson in CorporateResponsibility, Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 1974), reported in
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,010, 84,695 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Commissioner Sommer]. The Commission has announced a factfinding investigation into "going private" and has promulgated two proposed alternative rules under section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act which would provide for
substantive regulation of such transactions as well as disclosure. Proposed rule 13e-3A
would require that the consideration offered to the minority shareholders constitute
"fair value . . . as determined in good faith by the issuer or its affiliate, and shall be
no lower than that . . . recommended jointly by two qualified independent persons."
Proposed rule 13e-3B would require that the issuer have a "valid business purpose"
for the transaction, and that the terms be fair. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567
(Feb. 6, 1975); SEC, Proposed Rules 13e-3A, 13e-3B reprinted in [Current Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
23,704-05.
Shareholders have also had their say. Letters from aggrieved shareholders who
have been unwilling participants in "going private" transactions form the bulk of the
investigative file in the Commission's factfinding investigation.
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Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.
The Marshel'0 case presents the "going private" transaction in the most unappealing form. In the bull market of 1968,
Concord Fabrics, Inc., a New York corporation, made its first
public offering of 300,000 shares at $15 per share. Eleven
months later, Concord's controlling shareholders, the Weinstein brothers, publicly offered 200,000 shares of their own
stock at $20 per share. The Weinsteins retained ownership of
68% of Concord's outstanding stock.
Soon after the Weinsteins' offer, the price of the stock
began to decline along with the fortunes of the company and
the stock market in general. In January, 1975, with the stock
trading at under $2, the controlling shareholders decided to
eliminate the public shareholders and return the company to
their sole ownership. They formed AFW Fabric Corporation,
transferring to it their 68% of the outstanding Concord stock
in return for 100% of AFW's stock. AFW first made a tender
offer for Concord's publicly-held shares, but withdrew it when
Marshel, a minority shareholder, sued. As the controlling
shareholder of Concord, AFW then proceeded with its plan to
merge into Concord; the public shareholders were to receive $3
a share.
Although AFW's announced intention to vote its shares in
favor of the merger guaranteed shareholder approval, it did not
have enough shares to dispense with a formal meeting and
vote." A proxy statement was therefore mailed to the public
shareholders which stated that the purpose of the merger was
to "return the company to the status of a privately-held corporation owned by the Weinstein family" so that they could
"determine all policies of the Company, such as salaries for
themselves and others, dividends and business activities, without public scrutiny and solely with regard to their own interests. " 2 The proxy statement further informed Concord's public
10. Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976).
11. New York's "short-form" merger statute provides that a corporation which
owns 95% of the shares of another corporation may merge the two without advance
notice and without a vote of the subsidiary's shareholders. N.Y. Bus. CORP.LAW § 905
(McKinney 1963) as amended, (Supp. 1976-77). In other cases, the "long form" merger
must be used which requires the approval of two-thirds of the outstanding voting stock.
12. Appeal from Order of United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, app. at 68, Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Marshel Appendix].
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shareholders that the money to pay for their shares was to come
from short-term bank loans advanced to Concord immediately
following the merger.
Marshel quickly amended his complaint to challenge the
merger, asserting two 10b-5 claims. The first claim was a derivative count on behalf of Concord against the Weinsteins and
AFW, alleging that the merger would constitute a breach of the
defendants' fiduciary duty to Concord by forcing it to spend
"millions of dollars for no legitimate business purpose,"'"
thereby wasting Concord's assets "for the sole benefit of AFW
and the individual defendants."' 4
The second claim was a "class claim" against all the defendants, including Concord, on behalf of the public shareholders.'" It alleged that the $3 per share price was "unreasonably
low," enabling the defendants to "acquire for themselves an
interest in over $2,000,000 of Concord's assets which rightfully
belongs to the class."'"
Marshel then moved for a preliminary injunction to prohibit the merger during the pendency of the litigation. The
motion was denied by the trial judge.' 7 Seeing the essence of
the plaintiffs' complaints'" as the "class claim" charge that
defendants were defrauding them into selling their shares at an
unfair price," he concluded that, under the authority of Popkin
v. Bishop,2" injunctive relief is not available under the securi13. Id. at 44-45.
14. Id. at 18. Although the defendants aborted the merger, the derivative claim
will probably survive, both because Concord had already expended some funds and
because Marshel will probably claim the merger was called off because of his efforts,
entitling him to attorneys' fees for the resulting corporate benefit.
15. Although the complaint contains class allegations, no class determination
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23 has been made. Nor does it appear likely that such a
determination will be made, since the abortion of the merger has removed the class
claimants from the category of "forced sellers." See generally text accompanying note
61 infra. Nevertheless, for convenience, this count will be referred to as the class claim.
16. Marshel Appendix, supra note 12, at 19. Two additional pendent state law
claims track the language of the federal claims, adding that the $3 price is "grossly
unfair."
17. Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 398 F. Supp. 734, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
18. Marshel was joined by three other plaintiffs. One of them, suing in diversity
and alleging only violations of state law, joined in the appeal.
19. 398 F. Supp. at 737. This argument was indeed the core of the class claim,
but the judge's characterization ignored the derivative claim. Although the defendants
conceded, for the purpose of the motion, that there was no business purpose for the
merger other than to return Concord to private ownership (Marshel Appendix, supra
note 12, at 48), they too characterized the complaint as basically amounting to a claim
that the plaintiffs were being frozen out at "unreasonably low prices" (id. at 51) and
did not address the derivative claim.
20. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972), discussed in note 3 supra. Popkin had been

19771

FRAUD WITHOUT DECEIT

7

ties laws when there has been full disclosure, even if the merger
terms are unfair."
Marshel appealed to the Second Circuit. His brief on appeal stressed the derivative claim, although "class claim" arguments were freely intermingled.n The Court of Appeals reversed.23 The court's opinion did not focus on the difference
between the class and derivative claims. Nevertheless it seems
clear that the court's holding applies only to the derivative
federal claim:
We hold that when controlling stockholders and directors
of a publicly-held corporation cause it to expend corporate
funds to force elimination of minority stockholders' equity
uniformly followed in challenges to "going private" in the Second Circuit. Greenberg
v. Institutional Investor Sys., Inc., (1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,231 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975); Tanzer Economic Assocs. v.
Haynie, 388 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Drier v. Music Makers Group, Inc., [19731974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,406 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But see
Levine v. Biddle Sawyer, 383 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (using both deceit and the
"controlling influence-unfairness" standard to enjoin a freeze-out merger in a closelyheld corporation).
21. The court, having thus disposed of the merits of the plaintiff's federal claims,
noted that the "damage to be suffered by plaintiffs, should the merger be consummated and ultimately adjudicated illegal, will not be irreparable, since plaintiffs have
a sufficiently adequate remedy at law' in the way of monetary damages." 398 F. Supp.
at 739, quoting Tanzer Economic Assoc. v. Haynie, 388 F. Supp. 365, 369 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
The court went on to conclude that the plaintiffs' state law claims were equally
without merit, because the merger was permitted by statute and under New York law
appraisal was their exclusive remedy. 398 F. Supp. at 739. On appeal, plaintiffs contested the merger's legality under New York law. Their arguments were buttressed by
a decision of the New York Supreme Court, in a proceeding brought by the State
Attorney General under New York's Martin Act, granting a motion for a preliminary
injunction of the Concord-AFW merger. People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d
120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (App. Div., 1st Dept. 1975).
This article does not explore further the question whether the merger is legal under
New York law, since that question is irrelevant to a determination of the federal
claims. See text accompanying note 78 infra.
22. Brief for Plaintiff, Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Marshel Plaintiff's Brief]. While much was made of the difference between the book value of the stock and the $3 merger price, a "class claim"
argument (id. at 8, 18), the plaintiffs stated at another point:
This case. . . does not require an analysis of the fairnessof merger terms.
We are not here arguing that it is the obvious inadequacy of the $3 per
share price which invalidates the transaction. We are arguing, however,
that without a business purpose, the merger and the resolutions with
respect thereto are void as a matter of law whatever the price offered may
be.
Id. at 32-33 (emphasis in the original).
23. 533 F.2d at 1282.
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participation for reasons not benefiting the corporation but
rather serving only the interests of the controlling stockholders such conduct will be enjoined pursuant to Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 which prohibits "any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security." 4

The fairness or unfairness of the $3 merger price to the minority
shareholders was nowhere mentioned.
In short, the court held that a corporation has a claim for
relief under rule 10b-5 when its controlling shareholders cause
it to purchase securities for no business purpose, even though
the transaction was fully disclosed to all interested parties,
including the minority shareholders:
Under these circumstances it would surely be anomalous
to hold that a cause of action is stated under §10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 when the fraudulent conduct in connection
with a purchase or sale of securities includes deception but
that similarly fraudulent practices carried out with prior
disclosure to the helpless victim do not give rise to a Rule
10b-5 claim. Neither the statutory language nor the
broadly remedial purposes of the Act . . .allow such a
distinction. 5
24. Id. at 1281. The Court also described the merger as a "fraudulent scheme"
because "it represents an attempt by the majority stockholder to utilize corporate
funds for strictly personal benefit" (id. at 1282), and "a scheme by the appellees ...
to appropriate for their personal benefit the entire stock ownership of Concord at a
price determined by them and paid out of the corporate treasury at a cost of over
$1,600,000." Id. at 1280. In support of its holding, the court cited Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) and Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d
736 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc), both derivative cases, and stressed their application to
"fraud against the corporation." Id. at 1281.
25. 533 F.2d at 1282. In reaching its conclusion, the court had to distinguish or
overrule Popkin, which held that if the terms of an "unfair" merger were fully disclosed, no derivative action would lie. See note 3 supra. The court chose to distinguish
Popkin on the ground that the plaintiff in that case had merely challenged the fairness
of the merger, rather than the merger itself.
The distinction is dubious, to say the least. In both cases, the controlling shareholders were charged with a breach of fiduciary duty to the controlled corporation. In
both cases, this breach allegedly resulted in damage to the corporation. In Popkin, the
damage was in the unfair merger terms; in Marshel, the damage was supposedly the
use of corporate funds. Nor does the lack of business purpose alleged in Marshel make
a crucial difference, since the business purpose in Popkin-anearlier state court settlement requiring the merger-was attacked by the plaintiff as a sham.
Judge Hays, the author of the Marshel decision, also wrote the en banc opinion
in Schoenbaum, whose fairness doctrine was limited by Popkin to cases of nondisclosure. Judge Smith, who was on the Popkin panel, concurred in the Marshel result,
although he found it "difficult" to reconcile the 10(b) basis of the holding with the
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Putting aside for the'moment the question whether a holding that prior disclosure to a "helpless victim" forecloses a 10b5 claim is really an anomaly," it is worthwhile to examine the
decision on its own terms. It is essential to understand clearly
the Marshel holding. The court did not hold that "going private" without a business purpose violates rule 10b-5. The court
held that using corporatefunds to "go private," without a corporate business purpose, is a fraud on the corporation within
the meaning of the rule.
That holding makes no sense at all under the facts of the
case. First, in return for its $1.6 million, Concord would have
received shares which, according to the plaintiffs, were worth
more than $4.5 million. How, then, would the corporation be
damaged?"
Second, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
shares would not have been worth $1.6 million to Concord, a
derivative action would still be inappropriate. The shareholders were suing on behalf of the "old," prd-merger Concord, but
"old" Concord was not buying any shares.18 Further, apart from
some incidental pre-merger expenses, "old" Concord's funds
opinion in Popkin. After stating that the Marshel case "casts doubt on the desirability
of a 'full disclosure' bar in all situations," he added that the grant of the injunction
was sustainable under New York law. 533 F.2d at 1282 (concurring opinion).
26. See text accompanying notes 59-65 infra.
27. Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants addressed this issue in their briefs.
It was not contended that the shares would have a different value in the hands of
Concord than in the hands of the public shareholders. That argument is, however,
worth a closer look. If Concord's ability to resell the shares in a future public offering
were to be hampered by its past conduct in "going private"-which seems likely-the
shares could nevertheless be used for acquisitions and employee compensation. See
Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 908 (1975). While the shares might, therefore,
be valued differently in a face-to-face transaction between Concord and a third party
than by the stock market, the shares would still have had some value to Concord. The
plaintiffs might have argued that Concord was paying too much for the shares, because
it was offering a premium over market, but, perhaps understandably, they did not.
Such an argument would have been an admission that $3 a share was too generous.
See Raffa v. Mechanics Bldg. Material Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FD. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,535 (E.D.N.Y. April 28, 1976): "Initially it is interesting to note
that plaintiffs in their representative capacity are claiming that the $1 per share offer
is inadequate and in their derivative capacity maintain, in effect, that it will harm the
corporation." See also Rochelle v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. v. Arthur Young
& Co., 535 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1976) (a corporation cannot base a 10b-5 action on its
repurchase of its debentures at a discount because the corporation suffered no losses
upon the repurchase); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (no damage
to a corporation in buying its own shares at a depressed price).
28. Thus, "old" Concord does not meet the "purchaser-seller" requirement of a
10b-5 action as set forth in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975).
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were not being used. The corporate funds which were to be
expended would have come from loans to the "new," postmerger Concord-an entity which would have no public shareholders. The controlling shareholders, therefore, would not be
using someone else's money. At least for the purposes of a
derivative suit, they would have been spending their own
funds. As the Supreme Court recently noted: "The sole shareholder who defrauds or mismanages his corporation hurts only
himself. For the corporation to sue him for his wrongs is simply
to take money out of his right pocket and put it in his left." 2
The significance of the court's failure to distinguish between "new" and "old" Concord is best demonstrated by hypothesizing, for a moment, that AFW, rather than Concord,
had been designated the "surviving" corporation. AFW, not
Concord, would be the "purchaser"; AFW's money, not Concord's, would finance the merger (although the assets pledged
would remain exactly the same); and Concord's public shareholders would probably have no derivative standing to sue.'"
One must question the utility of any ground for decision so easy
to avoid."
29. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 721
(1975) (dissenting opinion). The dissent agreed with the majority on the inappropriateness of a derivative recovery for a sole shareholder's defalcations, but differed on
whether a subsequent shareholder could sue for the prior acts. The majority held that
the subsequent shareholder could not maintain a derivative action.
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 requires that the derivative action be one which the
corporation could properly assert. As noted earlier, since Concord is not a purchaser
or seller of shares, it cannot assert a 10b-5 claim. Additionally, the capacity of corporation to sue or be sued is determined by the law of the state in which it was organized.
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 591 n.12 (5th
Cir. 1974). Under New York law, even if "old" Concord had a valid 10b-5 claim, its
rights would pass to the survivor, AFW, and could not be asserted by Concord or its
shareholders. N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 906(b)(3) (McKinney 1963); Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949); accord, Vine v. Beneficial Fin.
Co., 374 F.2d 627, 637 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Voege v. Ackerman,
364 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Finally, while federal rather than state law determines a hareholder's standing under Rule 23.1 when a federal claim is asserted,
(Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc)), the contemporaneous
ownership requirement of the Rule would apparently block a claim by former shareholders who have "sold" their shares for cash in a merger, although it does not prevent
a claim when shares have been exchanged. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 20
F.R. SEiv. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Orenstein v. Compusamp, Inc., 19 F.R. Serv. 2d
466 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See generally 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.17, 23.1.18
(2d ed. 1976).
31. One must also question the appropriateness of a preliminary injunction in
this case, even before the merger was called off. The court of appeals never discussed
the showing necessary for injunctive relief. This silence led a subsequent panel to state
that "[olnce we assumed, in Marshel, that such conduct was in violation of the federal
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Even on its own terms, therefore, Marshel was incorrectly
decided. Derivative claims are sensible only in the case of an
ongoing public corporation. In a "going private" transaction, if
rule 10b-5 permits a claim for a fully-disclosed breach of fiduciary duty, it is the duty of the controlling shareholders and
directors to the minority shareholders, rather than to the corporation, which should be examined.
Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
Five days after the Marshel decision, a different panel of
the Second Circuit considered a "going private" merger. 2 This
time, the court focused directly on the class claims of the minority shareholders. 3
The Green plaintiffs were shareholders in Kirby Lumber
Company. They were frozen out in a merger between Kirby and
Forest Products, Inc., a corporation formed for that purpose by
Kirby's majority shareholder, Santa Fe Natural Resources,
Inc., which owned 95% of Kirby's stock.34 Resources is itself a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
Although the merger cashed out Kirby's minority shareholders, and may therefore be termed a "going private" transaction, Kirby was not really "public" before the merger.
Kirby's shares, which had been outstanding since the comsecurities laws, the ultimate result was a foregone conclusion and, hence, a preliminary
injunction was in order." Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310, 1312 (2d
Cir. 1976).
The Merrit court fairly assessed Marshel, but that assessment is not the law. The
mere fact that a plaintiff has a clear claim for relief does not entitle him or her to
equitable relief; "questions of liability and relief are separate in private actions under
the securities law, and . ..the latter is to be determined according to traditional
equitable principles." Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 64 (1975). Under
these principles, any damage caused Concord by the expenditure of its funds could
have been recompensed in money damages, although that would have led to the absurdity of the sole shareholders repaying themselves.
32. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976).
33. As in Marshel, no class determination had been made by the district court,
although the complaint contained class allegations. The complaint also asserted a
derivative cause of action, which the district court rejected because the "old" company
was no longer in existence, and a derivative recovery would benefit the sole shareholder. 391 F. Supp. at 856. The court of appeals did not address the derivative claim
and the trial judge later cited his Green opinion on the derivative point, noting that it
had been "rev'd on other grounds." Del Noce v. Delyar Corp., [Current Transfer
Binderl FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 85,670 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1976).
34. When Resources organized Forest Products, it contributed enough cash to
pay Kirby's shareholders in the planned merger. This cash contribution immediately
distinguishes Green from Marshel, since Kirby's assets were not used to finance the
merger.
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pany's reorganization in 1936, were not listed on a national
securities exchange, and Kirby was not subject to the reporting
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. "
Thus, Kirby-unlike Concord Fabrics-did not go public
on a bull market and private on a bear market. 31 Nevertheless,
for reasons which do not appear in the record, Kirby's parent
decided to remove Kirby's minority shareholders, utilizing Delaware's short-form merger statute. 7 Kirby's shareholders were
notified after the merger of their right to accept $150 a share
or seek appraisal.
The notification contained a thirty-three-page information
statement setting forth Kirby's financial position. Attached to
the statement were asset appraisals showing that the liquidation value of Kirby's assets was $320 million (which amounts
to $640 per share). Also attached was a letter from Morgan
Stanley & Co., an investment banker, giving its opinion that
the fair market value of the shares, apparently valued as a
going concern (taking into account the asset appraisals and the
publicly traded stock of similar companies) was $125 per
share."
The Green plaintiffs, having received the information
statement, filed an action in federal court alleging that the
Letter from Ronald A. Lane to Barbara Banoff (Dec. 2, 1976) [copy on file
L. REV.].
36. The Second Circuit opinion treats the facts in Green as if they were the same
as those in Marshel. The differences in the facts should have produced a different
analysis, even from a court inclined to condemn "going private" transactions generally.
See Greene, CorporateFreeze-out Mergers: A ProposedAnalysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487
(1976).
37. Delaware permits a parent corporation owning at least 90% of the capital
stock of a subsidiary to cause a merger of the parent into the subsidiary by adopting a
resolution of merger. Approval by the shareholders or board of directors of the subsidiary is not required. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974). Section 253 permits the shares
held by anyone other than the parent to be exchanged for other property. Shareholders
dissatisfied with the offering price may seek appraisal. The Delaware courts have noted
the purpose of section 253 is to permit freeze-out mergers. Accordingly, in cases where
the only dispute is how much the shares are worth, appraisal is the exclusive state
remedy, even if it is alleged that the price is grossly inadequate. Stauffer v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 202, 178 A.2d 311 (Ch.), aff'd, 41 Del. Ch. 7,187 A.2d 78 (Sup.
Ct. 1962).
38. Appeal from Order of United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, app. at 14A, Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976).
Morgan Stanley was named as a defendant in the subsequent complaint which
alleged that it "knowingly assisted and facilitated" the "fraud" by submitting an
appraisal it knew was too low. Id. at 76A. The district court's dismissal of the complaint was upheld on appeal as to Morgan Stanley, and the plaintiffs' petition for
certiorari on that issue has not been granted by the Supreme Court.
35.

at
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merger violated rule 10b-5 by freezing out shareholders, without prior notice, at a "wholly inadequate price.""5
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
district court granted their motion. 0 The court stated that the
plaintiffs' allegations had two distinct aspects: first, that the
method used to freeze out the minority shareholders operated
as a fraud, since the merger benefited the majority shareholders, without any justifiable business purpose, and without prior
notice; and second, that the low valuation placed on their
shares was in itself actionable.
The court then held that the first theory, which attacked
the Delaware short-form merger procedure, was "without
merit":
The primary objective of Rule 10b-5 is to impose a duty of
disclosure upon a corporation and its controlling persons.
Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972). That objective is to be achieved in conjunction with the state corporate law. This Court does not regard Rule 10b-5 as an
omnibus federal corporation law having such broad reach
as to modify the notice requirements of the Delaware
merger statute, or prevent Delaware in its legislative wisdom from providing a means by which a majority can exclude a minority from the corporation's future affairs, so
long as due process is satisfied, as it is here, by the appraisal procedures."
As to the second theory, that the undervaluation itself was
a fraud, the court accepted for the purposes of its decision the
plaintiffs' claimed valuation of $772, although it questioned the
propriety of using liquidation value as the sole basis for determining the "true worth" of the shares.4" The court pointed out,
39. Id. at 74A. The plaintiffs alleged that the stock was worth $772 a share. They
arrived at this figure by taking the amount by which the appraised value of the assets
($320,000,000) exceeded their book value ($9,000,000), or $311,000,000 and apportioning it on a per-share basis-which equals $622. They then simply added that $622 to
the $150 going concern value they were offered in the merger. Id. at 75A. If the asset
appraisals are correct, however, Kirby's liquidation value is $640 per share.
40. 391 F. Supp. at 855.
41. Id. at 853.
42. Id. See note 39 supra. In Del Noce v. Delyar Corp., [Current Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,670 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1976), the same judge noted that for
certain companies engaged in extractive operations, a liquidation may realize more
than a merger-the company may be "worth more dead than alive." Id. at 90, 297 n.ll.
Nevertheless, for purposes of determining damages resulting from a merger, the shares
exchanged would be valued at "going concern" and not liquidation value. The judge
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however, that the plaintiffs' valuation was based on information disclosed in the merger information statement, and that
the complaint did not allege an omission, misstatement or
fraudulent course of conduct which would have impeded a
shareholder's judgment of the value of the offer in determining
whether to seek appraisal. Relying, as did the Marshel district
court, on Popkin v. Bishop and its progeny, the court concluded that full disclosure removed the transaction from the
purview of rule 10b-5.13
The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Second Circuit, arguing that the short-form merger violated rule 10b-5 as
a "flagrant self-deal" in which the majority stockholder violated its fiduciary duty to the minority by cashing them out at
a grossly inadequate price, without prior notice or consent."
The Second Circuit panel agreed. Over a vigorous dissent
by Judge Moore, the court held that rule 10b-5 is violated when
a majority shareholder breaches "its fiduciary duty to deal
fairly with minority shareholders," 5 whether or not state law
grants appraisal rights or other relief to the plaintiffs. In the
context of Green's facts, that breach of fiduciary duty consisted
of three elements: (1) effecting the merger without any justifiable business purpose, (2) failing to give minority shareholders
advance notice of the merger, and (3) undervaluation of the
minority's shares.
It is important to note that, like the Marshel court, the
Green court did not adopt a "business purpose" test for freezeout mergers, but rather adopted a "business purpose-plus"
test. A simple "business purpose" test would prohibit freezeouts lacking a business purpose whether or not the price was
explicitly stated that "going concern" value is fair value, even if liquidation value is
higher, when there is no intention to liquidate the merged company. Id. at 90,305.

Professor Dyer reaches the opposite conclusion, stating the only economically
rational reason for not liquidating in such a situation must be that Kirby's controlling
shareholders place a higher value on Kirby as a going concern than would be realized
from liquidation. Accordingly, he argues, their own higher assessment of going concern
value should determine the price paid to the minority shareholders. Dyer, An Essay
on Federalism in PrivateActions Under Rule lOb-5, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 7, 23.
43. 391 F. Supp. at 854. The court went on to point out that even if the information statement were deceptive, the plaintiffs were not damaged by it, since they did
not accept the $150 cash-out price. Therefore, there was no causal connection between
any deception and the harm allegedly suffered by these plaintiffs. Id. at 855.
44. 533 F.2d 1283, 1285, 1288 (2d Cir. 1976).
45. Id.at 1289-1290, 1291. The majority opinion by Judge Medina undoubtedly
surprised those who remembered his dissent in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
215, 219 (2d Cir. 1968), in which he termed the fairness doctrine an "invitation to
blackmail and extortion."
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fair.4" In contrast, although there is language in the Green opinion which appears to support a simple "business purpose" test,
the opinion as a whole leaves no doubt that lack of prior notice
and undervaluation are necessary, if not in themselves sufficient, allegations.4 7
Thus, even under Green, a majority may cash out the minority without a business purpose if it gives prior notice of its
intention to do so and if it pays a fair price, and conversely-at
least so far-may behave as unconscionably as it likes in share
valuation if the merger has a business purpose."
The court's holding, thus stated, does not appear to remedy the "fraud" it defined. The court has, in effect, adopted the
rationale of the Delaware courts which it purported to reject:
when the only dispute is how much the shares are worth, the
state appraisal procedure is the exclusive remedy, even if the
price is grossly inadequate.49
If, however, the federal securities laws impose on majority
shareholders a duty to "deal fairly" with the minority, but do
not forbid freeze-outs, the essence of that duty is surely the
obligation to offer a fair price. A valid business purpose for the
transaction, and prior notice to the shareholders, are not adequate substitutes for the aggrieved minority whose dissatisfaction with their state remedy drove them to federal court in the
first place.
For example, the defendants in Green, unlike those in
Marshel, never conceded that the Kirby merger did not have a
business purpose. On remand, if the case is not reversed, that
purpose will have to be litigated, and the extensive discovery
and trial on that issue will be only tangentially related to the
fairness of the buy-out price.50 The Green plaintiffs will hardly
46. Such a test was adopted, on state law grounds, in Bryan v. Block & Blevins
Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974). The district court's
opinion in Bryan, 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rested on both rule 10b-5 and
state law, and its reasoning was adopted by another district court in Albright v.
Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974).
47. The Court specifically referred to lack of a business purpose and prior notification as "additional elements" to a charge of undervaluation in discussing the claim
against Morgan Stanley. 533 F.2d at 1292.
48. The court carefully stated that it was not holding that "the charge of excessively low valuation by itself satisfies the requirements of Rule 10b-5 because that is
not the case before us." Id. at 1291.
49. See note 37 supra.
50. Litigating the business purpose of a transaction may also be unrewarding for
the plaintiffs in most cases:
(It is seldom that a valid business purpose cannot be shown or con-
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be solaced by the notion that a benefit~to the corporation of
which they are no longer shareholders-the "business purpose"
of the transaction-is a sufficient reason for their forced contribution of over $500 a share to the deal (assuming that liquidation value is "fair" value).
Nor is prior notice likely to be helpful. The plaintiffs in
Green had argued that prior notice of the merger would have
given them an opportunity to seek injunctive relief, but advanced no other reason for requiring prior disclosure. 5 The
court agreed, stating that "the unavailability of this additional
[injunctive] remedy" was "further justification" for its holding. 2 As both the majority and the concurring opinions noted,
however, the frozen-out shareholders in a Delaware short-form
merger have no right to state court equitable relief, prospective
or otherwise. 53 Nor would these plaintiffs have been entitled to
federal injunctive relief, since their claims, even if assumed to
be valid, are compensable in damages.54 It seems strange, to say
the least, to hold that the defendants' failure to disclose the
merger before its consummation injured the plaintiffs by depriving them of something to which they were not entitled, and
stranger yet to assume that such notice will protect minority
shareholders in future transactions.
The court's choice of the elements of a claim for relief in a
"going private" transaction is therefore puzzling, given its view
of the wrong done to minority shareholders. Whatever specific
allegations are required in a "going private" case, however,
Green's broader holding is that rule 10b-5 prohibits all intentional breaches of fiduciary duty, whether or not the conduct
which constitutes the breach is disclosed.55
structed with a little ingenuity if need be; litigation on this point is not
likely to be any more restrictive of the corporation and the controlling
shareholders than is the business judgment rule in determining the propriety and legality of actions by corporate directors.
Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation,31 Bus. LAW.
883, 906 (1976). Indeed, even among the advocates of the business purpose test, there

are almost as many definitions of the test as there are commentators. See articles cited
note 9 supra.
51. Brief for Plaintiffs at 39-42, Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283
(2d Cir. 1976).
52. 533 F.2d at 1291.
53. Id. at 1289, 1297 n.4.
54. See Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310, 1311 (2d Cir. 1976):
"We affirm the denial of a preliminary injunction by the District Court primarily on
the ground that there is an adequate remedy at law." Merrit was a post-Green challenge to a short-form "going private" merger.
55. As noted earlier, the Sixth Circuit has refused to read Green that broadly.
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The court relied on clauses (1) and (3) of the rule, noting
that, of the three clauses in rule 10b-5, only clause (2) explicitly
deals with nondisclosure and misrepresentation. Clause (2)
makes it unlawful for any person "to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading" in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Clauses (1) and (3), on the other hand, make it unlawful
"to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," or to
"engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person" in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
These provisions, according to Judge Medina, "state explicitly that fraud other than and in addition to a failure to
disclose or truthfully represent is also actionable."57 For purposes of those "broader" clauses of the rule, therefore, allegations "of breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority against minority shareholders" are sufficient; "in such cases, including
the one now before us, no allegation or proof of misrepresen58
tation or nondisclosure is necessary.

See Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976). Other courts however, have
applied Green to a variety of corporate transactions in which a breach of fiduciary duty
has been alleged. See cases cited note 8 supra.
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
57. 533 F.2d at 1287.
58. Id. Although the court tried valiantly to make its holding look like just
another lob-5 case, saying that it did not "write on a clean slate," (id. at 1286) the
cases relied on simply do not support that assertion. Only the Marshel decision, five
days earlier, prevented Green's tabula from being entirely rasa.
In support of its conclusion, the court quoted language defining equitable fraud
as encompassing breaches of fiduciary duty and overreaching in SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (which in fact held merely that an
investment advisor must disclose to his clients his own trading in recommended
stocks), and the famous dicta in Pepper v. Litton, 305 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) (involving a bankruptcy court's powers of equitable subordination), on a corporate fiduciary's
obligation to show the inherent fairness of transactions with the corporation.
The court also relied on Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, discussed in note 3 supra,
which it said held that "improper self-dealing and a breach of fiduciary duty, without
more, constituted a violation of Rule lOb-5," 533 F.2d at 1290. The court thus applied,
without further explanation, a derivative holding, which addressed the problem of the
deceived fiction, to class claims brought by human beings who were not deceived.
Not surprisingly, the Green opinion noted with approval the decision in Marshel;
quite surprisingly, it also contended that Popkin v. Bishop, discussed in notes 3 and
25 supra, supports its opinion, because the Popkin merger had a "compelling" business
purpose-the prior settlement agreement attacked by Popkin as a sham-and because
in Popkin, disclosure occurred prior to the merger. Of course, in Marshel, which Green
cited with approval, the facts surrounding the merger were also disclosed prior to the
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The underlying philosophy of the court's holding is that
disclosure is irrelevant when minority shareholders do not have
the power to alter the result. 9 Thus, the court adopts, without
attribution, the Marshel rationale that full disclosure to a
"helpless victim" is as much a fraud as nondisclosure is to
someone making a choice.
If the "helpless victim" argument sounds familiar, it is
because we have heard it before-not in defining fraud, but in
deciding whether a merger transaction comes within the rule
at all.'" Ironically, the "forced seller" doctrine, which holds
that participants in a merger are sellers under the rule,8 was
developed because defendants in 10b-5 litigation argued that
an exchange of shares or property in a merger did not involve
a volitional act on the part of individual shareholders, and was
not therefore a "sale" of their shares. In other words, they
argued that disclosure was irrelevant because the plaintiffs
were helpless victims.
After initially adopting this "no sale" position for purposes
of registration under the Securities Act of 1933,2 the Securities
and Exchange Commission decided that shareholders were not
helpless after all; the act of voting and the decision whether to
dissent and exercise appraisal rights are both investment decimerger. Further, while Popkin did state that the full disclosure philosophy underlying
the securities acts has "special" relevance when shareholders have the right to vote, it
did not say this is the sole relevance of disclosure. See, in this connection, Lewis v.
Siegel, [1973 Transfer Binderl FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,992 (S.D.N.Y. May 18,
1973), in which the Popkin rationale was applied to an allegedly unfair but fully
disclosed debenture rights offering, even though shareholder approval was not required. See also Kaplan, FiduciaryResponsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883, 921 (1976): "In the final eventuality, whether or not shareholders have the right to vote, the Popkin decision says that 'emphasis on improper
self dealing does not eliminate non-disclosure as a key issue in rule 10b-5 cases.'
59. 533 F.2d at 1292:
Whether full disclosure has been made is not the crucial inquiry since
it is the merger and the undervaluation which constitute the fraud,
and not whether or not the majority determines to lay bare their real
motives. If there is no valid corporate purpose for the merger, then even
the most brazen disclosure of that fact to the minority shareholders in no
way mitigates the fraudulent conduct.
60. Fraud, however defined, must still be "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security." The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must be an actual
purchaser or seller to sue. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975).
61. One recent commentator has suggested the "forced seller" doctrine does not
survive Blue Chip. Gallager, 1Ob-5 After Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands the Judicial
Oak?, 80 DIcK. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1975). However, the Court in Blue Chip cited several
"forced seller" cases with apparent approval. 421 U.S. at 746-47 & n.10.
62. Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1968).
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sions requiring the protections of the Act.

3

This change was prompted in part by judicial decisions
holding that a merger is a "sale" for purposes of rule 10b-5
precisely because the shareholders are required to make an
investment decision affected by a misrepresentation or omission. 4 If disclosure is indeed irrelevant when the minority
shareholders' decision cannot change the result, and if the existence of appraisal rights is also irrelevant to the coverage of
rule 10b-5, the argument may prove too much. The anomaly
produced by full disclosure to helpless victims which is decried
by the Green and Marshel courts may as logically be resolved
by excluding "forced sellers" in that situation from the coverage of the rule as by extending it beyond disclosure."
Judge Moore's impassioned dissent in Green did not discuss the self-contradictory bootstrapping involved in the
"forced seller/helpless victim" dichotomy, but it covered considerable ground nevertheless. Castigating the majority opinion as "legal legerdemain" and "judicial legislation,"6 he reviewed prior 10b-5 cases to "dispel at once any rumors that
10b-5 no longer concerns itself with fraud,"6 7 meaning deception, and then proceeded to his main concern-the majority's
invasion of the traditional province of the states:
There is no question that it is within the proper power of
the State to enact statutes regulating corporation mergers.
Corporations are creatures of the State. They are created
63. Rule 145(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1976).
64. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); Swanson v. American
Consumers Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969), modified, 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir.
1973); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967). In Swanson, faced with an argument that deception was irrelevant because
the minority shareholders did not have the power to alter the result, the court noted
that appraisal rights would be affected and said, "We are not prepared to sanction a
rule of causation which would presume that full disclosure could have no transactional
function in corporate affairs." 415 F.2d at 1332.
In Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967), a short-form merger was held to be a "purchase and sale" simply because the
shares were converted into cash, whether directly or through exercise of the appraisal
remedy. The court noted, however, that the plaintiff would still have to prove that the
defendants deceived other shareholders into tendering enough shares to make the
short-form merger possible in order to satisfy the "in connection with" requirement.
Thus, someone must have been in a position to make an investment decision, which
affected the defendant's ability to turn the plaintiffs into "forced sellers," in order for
plaintiffs to sue.
65. See generally Dyer, An Essay in Federalismin Private Actions Under Rule
lOb-5, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 7, 16-19.
66. 533 F.2d at 1304 (Moore, J., dissenting).
67. Id.at 1303.
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under State law; they are empowered by State statute; and
they are regulated by the legislative mandates of the State
which has sanctioned their existence. Every State in the
Union has comprehensive general business or corporation
codes which attest to the exercise of the States' proper
responsibilities over the formation of corporate entities
and the regulation of corporate activities."

Judge Moore then went on to demonstrate that the shortform merger in Green complied with state law, and that the
defendants had not breached any fiduciary duty recognized by
Delaware." 9 He also stressed the availability of appraisal rights,
pointing out that the federal remedy would do no more than
"determine a fair buy-out price,"7 and thus require the same
battle of experts which would have existed in the state court.7'
68. Id. at 1302. As stated earlier, the majority's attempt to wrap itself in precedent cannot disguise the novelty of its holding.
69. Judge Moore's characterization of the conflict between Delaware law and the
majority holding is not quite correct. While Delaware's statute does not require advance notice of a short-form merger (see note 37 supra), and Delaware's courts have
not required a business purpose for "going private" (see, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox
Co.,
A.2d (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1976)), Delaware does not grant majority stockholders the right to undervalue the minority's shares. Delaware may not characterize
the obligation to give fair value as a "fiduciary duty," but it has provided a method
for enforcing it-the appraisal proceeding. However, there is no doubt that Delaware
itself agrees with Judge Moore. It urged the Second Circuit to re-hear Green en banc,
and requested permission to file an amicus brief. Letter of Richard Weir, Jr., Attorney
General, to court clerk, March 1, 1976.
The conflict between state law and the Green holding was the subject of Professor
Dyer's interesting article, An Essay on Federalismin PrivateActions Under Rule l0b5, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 7. Stating that the creation of a federal claim for conduct permitted under state law raises "significant policy questions," Professor Dyer suggests a
resolution: a federal fiduciary standard may be proper if it reflects a principle of
equivalent treatment, but possible conflicts with state standards should be resolved
by requiring a plaintiff to exhaust any state remedies before resorting to federal court.
Dyer does not convincingly explain why two proceedings are better than one in
this area of 10b-5 litigation, but not in any other. More significantly, he does not
examine the federalism concepts inherent in the division of subject matter jurisdiction
between federal and state courts. Indeed, he views the question whether deception is
essential to fraud as "trivial," since it raises "only" a question of choice of forum when
the violation of a state fiduciary standard is asserted. Id. at 15. Where federal diversity
jurisdiction exists, the choice of forum to enforce a state claim may well be "trivial,"
although those concerned with lessening the burdens on federal court calendars undoubtedly see it differently. Absent diversity jurisdiction, however, the determination
of the scope of rule 10b-5 is central to a federal court's power to decide the state claim.
70. 533 F.2d at 1309. Judge Mansfield's concurrence had condemned the procedural inadequacies of the Delaware appraisal remedy and noted that a federal court
might use a different measure of valuation. 533 F.2d at 1297 & n.4 (Mansfield, J.,
concurring).
71. Id. at 1309 (Moore, J., dissenting). Had the Kirby shares been listed on a
stock exchange, the Delaware appraisal statute would not have provided an arena for
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He concluded that the majority had extended rule 10b-5 to
afford to plaintiffs a substantive right "in complete derogation
of a valid state rule regulating corporate activity,

72

thus

"putting a torch to the teachings
which "put an end
to federal common law and forbade the federal courts from
formulating their own 'better rule.'""
Judge Moore's wrath is misdirected. It is simply not true
to say that the federal securities laws violate the teachings of
Erie if they impose duties on corporate insiders not imposed by
state law (or, to put it concisely, that conduct lawful under
state law may not be unlawful under federal laws).75 For example, rule 10b-5 has long been interpreted as requiring insiders
to disclose material information before they trade in their company's securities, whether or not state law permits inside trading on undisclosed information.7
The issue, therefore, is not state power versus federal
power. When federal power is granted, it is "paramount,"" and
whether state law also prohibits the conduct involved is irrelevant.7" A plaintiff damaged by conduct which violates both
of Erie"73

the battle. Delaware is one of the 20 states with a "market exception" to the appraisal
statute, which assumes that dissenting shareholders have no need for appraisal since
they can sell listed shares on the market. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (1975).
See Comment, A Reconsiderationof the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting
Shareholder's Right of Appraisal, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1023 (1976).
72. 533 F.2d at 1307 (Moore, J., dissenting).
73. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
74. 533 F.2d at 1307 (Moore, J., dissenting). Judge Moore also disagreed with the
notion that the majority's holding is a better rule, believing "going private" transactions to be "corporate actions of the utmost simplicity and patent reasonableness in
today's economy and securities market." Id. at 1300. As noted earlier, commentators
have differed on the merits of "going private," and this article does not attempt to
reargue the question.
75. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 383 (1964).
76. Compare Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d
228 (2d Cir. 1975), with Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975) (Florida law does
not forbid "tippee" trading). See Ratner, Federal and State Rules in the Regulation
of Insider Trading, 31 Bus. LAW. 947 (1976).
Other examples abound. For instance, the Investment Company Act has been held
to impose a federal fiduciary standard which may vary from the state common law
(Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971)), and the federal interest in fair corporate suffrage, as expressed in the proxy rules, overrides state law permitting management to deal with shareholder proposals in a less protective way. SEC v. Transamerica
Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
77. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459 (1969).
78. Any doubts about the validity of this statement with regard to corporate
mismanagement should have been set to rest by Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). That decision's interpretation of the "in connection
with" clause'of rule 10b-5 may be criticized, see, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d
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state and federal law has his or her choice of forum; a plaintiff
damaged by conduct which violates federal law, but not state
law, may proceed in federal court."
The question is not one of deference to state legislation and
the Erie doctrine, but whether the federal law, properly construed, reaches the questioned conduct. It is thus necessary to
consider whether the language of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
may be construed to include substantive federal standards of
conduct (whether stated as "fiduciary duty," "fairness" or
"business purpose") which go beyond disclosure.
THE STATUTE

It is perhaps significant that in both Green and Marshel
the text of the statute to be construed was mentioned briefly
and then forgotten.'" It should not have required the Supreme
1001, 1014 n.26 (2d Cir. 1975) ("the Supreme Court, as we read its opinion, has pushed
the petimeters rather far"), but the Court's treatment of the role of state law is clearly
correct: "Since there was a 'sale' of a security and since fraud was used 'in connection
with' it, there is redress under Section 10(b), whatever might be available as a remedy
under state law." 404 U.S. at 12. To hold otherwise would provide an affirmative
defense against a federal charge for every defendant whose conduct also violated a
state's blue sky laws or corporate fiduciary requirements.
Interestingly, once the Superintendant of Insurance gained his federal forum, he
chose to proceed in state court, and the settlement reached there provided for the
dismissal of the federal suit. Superintendant of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., [19751976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,385 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1975).
79. The other possible permutations are, of course, that state law will provide a
remedy but federal law will not, or that neither forum will be available. That state
law may reach conduct morally objectionable but not federally illegal may comfort
those displeased by the denial of a federal right (see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738 n.9 (1975)), but unless one adopts a "jurisdiction by moral
necessity" approach, the lack of a state remedy is no more relevant to the existence of
the federal right than is the presence of a state remedy. A fortiori, the procedural
difficulties of obtaining the state remedy, and the procedural advantages of the federal
rules, cannot justify the extension of a federal right.
As noted earlier, Judge Mansfield, in his Green concurrence, criticized the Delaware appraisal procedures. That criticism is widely shared. See Brudney, A Note on
"Going Private," 61 VA. L. REV. 1019 (1975); Brudney & Chirelstein, FairShares in
Corporate Mergers an Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974); Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962); Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the DissentingShareholder'sAppraisalRight, 77 HARV. L. REV.
1189 (1964).
Nevertheless, the procedural advantages of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the nationwide service of process and liberal venue provisions of the Securities
Acts, are incidents of a federal right under those statutes. Procedural rights are not
intended to alter a preexisting substantive right, let alone confer one which would not
otherwise exist.
80. In Marshel, the language was set forth in a footnote. 533 F.2d at 1281 n.5. In
Green, it was never quoted in full. 533 F.2d at 1295 (Mansfield, J., concurring). Even
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Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder," however, to
remind courts that the scope of rule 10b-5 cannot exceed that
of the statute."2 If section 10(b) does not reach fraud without
deceit, it does not matter how far the language of the rule might
be stretched.
Section 10(b) is the "catch-all ' 83 provision of the Securities Exchange Act. It makes it unlawful "to use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security

. . .

any

manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors." 4 The key words are "manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance." Although this section is
often referred to as an "anti-fraud" statute, the word
"fraud"-equitable or otherwise-nowhere appears. If conduct
is neither manipulative nor deceptive, it is not prohibited
under the language of the section.
The conduct in Green and Marshel was admittedly not
deceptive. 5 Was it, then, manipulative? Judge Mansfield, in
the Green dissent paid little attention to the statute, relying instead on the language
of the rule. See id. at 1300 n.2.
81. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
82. Id. at 214. Ernst & Ernst was decided a month after Marshel and Green. Only

one case has so far considered its application to the Second Circuit decisions, and then
only on the question of the requisite scienter for a Green/Marshel breach of fiduciary
duty. Bailey v. Meister Brau, 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976), held that a "grossly negligent" failure to recognize the unfairness of a transaction was sufficient.
If Ernst & Ernst was merely a scienter case, then the requisite allegation in
Marshel would presumably have been a "knowing" or "intentional" breach of the
majority shareholders' duty not to use corporate funds for their own benefit without a
corporate business purpose. In Green, however, where the gravamen of the "fraud" is
a breach of the duty to "deal fairly" with the minority shareholders, it is difficult to
reconcile an allegation of "knowing" or "intentional" unfairness with the controlling
shareholders' reliance on an independent appraisal of the value of the minority's
shares, particularly since the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
as to the appraiser. See note 38 supra.
In any event, the significance of Ernst & Ernst, for purposes of this article, is not
its holding on scienter, but on the proper method of statutory construction. See Note,
Judicial Retrenchment Under Rule lOb-5: An End to the Rule as Law?, 1976 DUKE L.J.
789.
83. "Of course subsection (c) [§ 9(c) of H.R. 7852, which became § 10(b)] is a
catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices." Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R.
8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess., 115 (1934) (testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran).

84. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1970).
85. While the complaints in both Green and Marshel contained allegations of
deception, the complaint in Green was dismissed, and the preliminary injunction in
Marshel was denied, by the trial courts, which rejected the sufficiency of the allegations. See text accompanying notes 17, 40 supra. The court of appeals assumed in both
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his Green concurrence, repeatedly characterized the merger as
"manipulative," presumably using "manipulate" in its common dictionary meaning-"to manage artfully or shrewdly,
especially in an unfair way.""6 As the Supreme Court noted in
Ernst & Ernst, however, the word manipulative "is and was
virtually a term of art when used in connection with the securities market. It connotes intentional and willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities.""s In that sense, manipucases that the challenged conduct was fully disclosed and that shareholders were not
deceived. See text accompanying notes 25, 55 supra.
It should be noted that there was no claim in Marshel that the Weinstein brothers
had an undisclosed intention to "go private" at the time of the public offerings. An
intent to freeze out public shareholders if the market declined would undoubtedly be
considered material by purchasers in the initial offerings, and would therefore have
met the traditional 10b-5 test.
86. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1376 (1971). See Kaplan,
FiduciaryResponsibility in the Management of the Corporation,31 Bus. LAW. 883, 90506 (1976):
IWlith a little ingenuity and receptiveness, [manipulative] might have
an elastic definition which would permit its application to other situations either (a) where the form of the transaction is artificially constructed (as for example in de facto mergers) or (b) the transaction is
essentially a sham or where there is no valid business purpose or (c) by
virtue of coercive actions the minority shareholders could be said to be
acting at the will of another, in the sense that the puppet is manipulated
by his master.
87. 425 U.S. at 199. The Court's conclusion as to the meaning of "manipulative"
in section 10(b) is buttressed by the specific types of manipulation enumerated in
sections 9 and 10(a). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i-78j(a) (1970). Section 9, titled "Manipulation
of Securities Prices," prohibits certain actions taken "for the purpose of creating a false
and misleading appearance of active trading," and other actions which actually create
active trading for the purpose of inducing trades by others. Significantly, all of the
prohibitions of section 9 apply only to securities registered on a national securities
exchange or to transactions involving the use of the facilities of a national securities
exchange. This further supports the conclusion that "manipulation" means market
manipulation.
Section 10(a) also applies only to registered securities; it prohibits the use of short
sales and stop-loss orders in contravention of Commission rules. While section 10(b)
specifically applies to unregistered, as well as registered securities, the word
"manipulative" as used there cannot fairly be read outside the context in which
it
appears. In other words, "manipulative" in section 10(b) means activities which deliberately and artificially affect the price of securities in whatever market exists for them.
Mr. Rosenfeld, in his Essay in Support of the Second Circuit's Decisions in Marshel
v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 131
(1976), suggests that it is "arguably" a market manipulation to freeze stock at a price
that is historically low and force all shareholders to sell their stock at the frozen price
level. His argument would have considerable force if the "historic low" were created
for that purpose by the majority shareholders who seek to take advantage of it. See
note 89 infra. There is a vast difference, however, between transactions aimed directly
at raising or depressing the price of a stock, and purchases or sales-forced or voluntary-based on the price produced by an unmanipulated market. It should also be

1977]

FRAUD WITHOUT DECEIT

lation is a form of nonverbal deceit, and cases dealing with
charges of market manipulation under rule 10b-5 have consistently viewed it that way."5
Neither Green nor Marshel presents a case of market manipulation." Without deceit, therefore, there was no fraud cognizable under section 10(b), at least if the words of the statute
are taken to mean what they say.
Green and Marshel ignore the language of section 10(b),
adding to the prohibition against manipulation and deception
a third category of forbidden conduct: "breaches of fiduciary
duty." The statute is construed as though it forbade
"inequitable" devices or contrivances. This construction, according to the Second Circuit, was required by the Supreme
Court's command to read the statute "flexibly, not technically
or restrictively."9'
A flexible reading is warranted to carry out the purposes
of the Act, but not to rewrite the statute for purposes supplied
by the judiciary and not by the legislature." An examination
of the legislative history of the 1934 Act, and that of the other
securities regulation statutes which must be read in pari
materia,2 demonstrates no legislative intent to outlaw fully
noted that the merger price in Marshel was 30% above the then-market price for the
stock, and that the $150 per share offered in Green was in fact an historic high.
88. United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W.
3409 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 378-81
(2d Cir. 1974); Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 792-98 (2d Cir.
1969); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967).
89. The complaint in Marshel alleged, on information and belief, that Concord
issued improper financial statements and ceased paying dividends in 1970 in order to
depress the price of the stock. Marshel Appendix, supra note 12, at 13. However, on
the motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiffs did not contradict defendants' affidavits denying manipulation and setting forth the business reasons for failing to pay
dividends. Id. at 52-55, 104-09. The court of appeals decision, ignoring as it did the
class claim "fairness" issue, did not address the allegations of manipulation. Presumably, if the case proceeds on the damages issue, plaintiffs will have an opportunity to
prove manipulation, if it existed. No charge of market manipulation was made in
Green; the shares traded only sporadically over-the-counter.
90. Superintendant of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
91. It is a basic premise of this article that the courts, in interpreting a claim of
statutory right, should feel themselves constrained by the language of the statute and
the intent of the legislature to the extent that it can be determined. I do not wish to
be understood as an opponent of judicial creativity generally; when the legislature has
failed to consider issues which later arise, or when both statute and legislative history
are ambiguous or silent, there is more room for play. When, however, competing policy
considerations have been weighed by the legislature, and its choice is reasonably
clear-which I believe to be the case in the issue under discussion-then the legislative
determination should stand.
92. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 206, quoting SEC v. National Sec.,
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disclosed but "unfair" practices.
The preamble to the 1934 Act states that its purpose is
"to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such [securities] exchanges and [over-the-counter] markets," 3 and
section 2 adds a purpose "to insure the maintenance of fair
and honest markets."94 It is quite clear, however, that fairness
and equity in this context refer to market manipulation, not to
intracorporate relationships. The House Report on the Act
states: "to insure to the multitude of investors the maintenance
of fair and honest markets, manipulative practices of all kinds
on national exchanges are banned."9 The Senate investigative
report agrees: "The purpose of the act is . . . to purge the
securities exchanges of those practices which have prevented
them from fulfilling their primary function of furnishing open
markets for securities where supply and demand may freely
meet at prices uninfluenced by manipulation or control." 9
Thus, the legislative purpose to prevent "unfair and inequitable practices" is entirely compatible with the limitation
of section 10(b) to manipulative and deceptive devices, and
cannot support-let alone compel-the implication of an additional prohibition against all intentional breaches of fiduciary
duty.
In his Green concurrence, Judge Mansfield points to another legislative purpose-that of "protecting . . . the securities market from devices serving to discredit it,"" 7 which "make
the individual shareholder even more hostile to . . . the securities markets than he already is."" Thus, he argued, section
10(b) applies to transactions which undercut investor confidence in the fairness of securities transactions.9
Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969): "the interdependence of the various sections of the
securities laws is certainly a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language
Congress has chosen."
93. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881.
94. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
95. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934).
96. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1934).
97. 533 F.2d at 1295.
98. Id. at 1296, quoting Commissioner Sommer, supra note 9, at 84,695.
99. Accord, Comment, The Second CircuitAdopts a Business Purpose Test For
Going Private: Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc.,
64 CALIF. L. REV. 1184, 1196 (1976). The author states that the legislative purpose to
promote investor confidence justifies a general interpretation of the rule which would
empower federal courts to correct "patterns of abuse, such as the going private phenomenon, because of their deleterious effect on public confidence." Mr. Rosenfeld's article makes a similar point, stating that the economic purpose of the securities laws was
to promote investor confidence in the capital markets, and that permitting some com-
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Judge Mansfield's argument finds some initial support in
the House Committee report. There is, indeed, broad language
in that report which, taken out of context, might be taken to
mean that the Commission may promulgate any rule of corporate fiduciary duty which will promote investor confidence in
corporate ethics:
If investors' confidence is to come back to the benefit
of exchanges and companies alike, the law must advance. .

. Unless constant extension of the legal concep-

tion of a fiduciary relationship-a guarantee of "straight
shooting"-supports the constant extension of mutual confidence which is the foundation of a maturing and complicated economic system, easy liquidity of the resources in
which wealth is invested is a danger rather than a prop to
the stability of the system. 00
The rest of the Committee report, however, makes it clear that
the codified "fiduciary relationship" required to support investor confidence is a fiduciary duty to disclose.'0' There is no
indication of any intent to legislate fiduciary obligations beyond disclosure.
Further, if the "investor protection" purpose of the Act
itself confers upon the Commission the power to promulgate
any rule it likes which would promote investor confidence generally, then the language of section 10(b) is meaningless. The
section provides that the Commission may prescribe rules "as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors," but that "necessary and appropriate" clause
is a limitation of the Commission's power to prohibit
"manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances," not an
independent grant of power. °2
panies to "go private" will affect the ability of other companies to obtain public
financing. Rosenfeld, Essay in Support of the Second Circuit's Decisions in Marshel
v. AFW Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 111, 127 (1976).
100. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934).
101. Id. at 13-14. The section dealing with "control of unfair practices by corporate insiders" gives two examples of the conduct to be regulated: trading on undisclosed inside information, and management misrepresentations in corporate proxies.
102. In fact, as originally drafted, the section would have made unlawful "any
device or contrivance which, or any device or contrivance in a way or manner which
the Commission may by its rules and regulations find detrimental to the public interest
or to the proper protection of investors." S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(c) (1934);
H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(c) (1934). Through a series of changes, the present
narrower wording was enacted. While the legislative history is silent on the reasons for
the .changes, it is useful to compare a similar narrowing process in the language and
history of section 13(e) of the 1934 Act, which was enacted in 1969, and pursuant to
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Proponents of a broad reading of the section are forced to
fall back on such "purpose" arguments because the legislative
history of section 10(b) itself is sparse. This Congressional silence, however, would seem to support a narrow reading of the
section. It is particularly unlikely that the 1934 Act would have
so completely altered the basic disclosure philosophy of the
Securities Act of 1933 without calling some attention to Congressional intent to do so.'"3 Any intent to impose broader fiduwhich the Commission's proposed "going private" rules have been promulgated.
Section 13(e), as enacted, makes it unlawful for an issuer subject to its provisions
to
purchase any security issued by it if such purchase is in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission, in the public interest or
for the protection of investors, may adopt (A) to define acts and practices
which are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative, and (B) to prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent such practices.
As originally introduced, the section would have simply prohibited repurchases "in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary and appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or in order
to prevent such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative." H.R.
14475, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (emphasis
added).
The chairman of the SEC at that time interpreted the original provision as conferring upon the Commission the power to adopt rules in the public interest, or to protect
investors, "irrespective of the question whether, or our ability to prove that, such
activity is or may be fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative. The language, for this
reason, is broader in its scope than presently applicable provisions of the Exchange
Act." Hearingson S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1967) (testimony of Manuel F.
Cohen); Hearings on H.R. 14475 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of
the House Comm. on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1968).
The House subcommittee then amended the provision because the statutory language:
was in the disjunctive and lent itself to the possible although improbable
interpretation that the Commission had authority to issue rules and regulations regarding the corporate purchase of its own securities in the public
interest, or for the protection of investors, quite apart from whether designed solely to prevent acts and practices that are fraudulent, deceptive,
of [sic] manipulative. The revised language makes it clear that such
rules and regulations may be adopted only for these purposes.
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1968).
This legislative history was noted by those who questioned the Commission's
power to enact proposed Rules 13(e)-3A and B. See, e.g., Letter from Sullivan &
Cromwell to George Fitzsimmons, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission,
March 14, 1975 [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.].
103. The second session of the 73d Congress would not have been unaware of the
great debate in the first session over the proper role of the national government in
securities regulation. Congress had considered, and rejected, comprehensive "blue
sky" regulation which would have required decisions as to the merits of a securities
offering or the honesty of an issuer. Instead, the 1933 Act adopted the disclosure
philosophy which is its primary characteristic.
This is not to say that the 1933 Act does not create federal fiduciary duties. Like
that of the 1934 Act which followed it, the legislative history of the 1933 Act emphasizes
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ciary obligations would surely have been clearly expressed." '
Another persuasive indication that Congress did not intend to mandate broad intracorporate fiduciary responsibilities
in the 1934 Act is the existence of the Investment Company Act
of 1940. ' "' That act specifically legislated federal fiduciary duties which go far beyond disclosure with regard to investment
companies and their affiliates, underwriters and advisors. The
1940 Act concerned itself, among other things, with self-dealing
and with unfair mergers' 0 -the subjects of the Green and
Marshel opinions.
Significantly, the legislative history of the 1940 Act contains a statement by the SEC's witness on the difference bethat those who manage banks, corporations, and other agencies handling or using other
people's money are trustees acting for others. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
2-26 (1933) (report of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce to accompany H.R. 5480). However, the committee reports make it clear that the fiduciary
responsibilities involved are those of "full and fair disclosure." Id. The section on the
Imposition of Standards of Trusteeship demonstrates that the fiduciary obligation
imposed is only to disclose (id. at 5), pointing out that the mechanism to enforce those
standards is contained in the civil liabilities provisions of the Act (sections 11 and 12),
which "attach only when there has been an untrue statement of material fact or an
omission to state a material fact in the registration statement or prospectus." Id. at 9.
For a general discussion of the legislative history and purpose of the 1933 Act, see
Douglas & Bates, The FederalSecurities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933); Landis,
The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959).
104. Congress would certainly have been aware that it was treading new ground.
The idea that corporate fiduciary standards were generally within the province of the
states was no less accepted in 1934 than in 1975, when the Supreme Court stated:
"Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate
directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the
internal affairs of the corporation." Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). In Cort, the
Court refused to imply a private federal right of action under the federal campaign laws
in favor of a derivative plaintiff for allegedly illegal corporate contributions in the form
of an ideological advertisement. Although the Court recognized that the securities laws
do "expressly require" certain management-shareholder responsibilities, it seems unlikely that a different result would have been reached with a 10b-5 claim for breach of
fiduciary duty if the money to pay for the advertisement had been obtained from the
sale of securities, thus furnishing the requisite nexus with a securities transaction.
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970). Although the views of a subsequent
Congress may form "a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one,"
(United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 349 (1963)), when statutes
are to be read in pari materia that hazard is slight. The opinion of Congress in 1940
as to the scope of the 1933 and 1934 Acts is therefore valuable.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (1970), prohibits securities transactions, including
mergers, between investment companies and their affiliated persons unless the SEC
grants an exemption under section 17(b). An exemption may be granted if the transaction is fair to all persons concerned, free from overreaching, and consistent with the
Act's purposes. For an illustration of the difficulty encountered by courts in determining "fairness" even under an act which specifically requires it, see the text accompanying note 132 infra.
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tween the 1933 and 1934 Acts and the Investment Company
Act:
The Securities Act and the Securities and Exchange Act
provide no regulation whatever of these investment trusts.
They are simply required to make disclosure. The pending
measure is a regulatory measure. It undertakes to regulate
certain practices and to stop certain things. And, the Securities Act undertakes no such results. Under the Securities Act, if a man makes complete disclosure, he can do
anything, almost, that he pleases; but there are certain
practices that have happened in connection with investment companies that I think everybody agrees.

.

.

ought

and they cannot be stopped by mere discloto be 0stopped,
7
sure.

If that statement was in error, and section 10(b) goes beyond "mere disclosure" to reach self-dealing, unfair mergers,
and other management abuses of shareholder trust, much of
the legislation establishing federal fiduciary standards for investment company managers was either unnecessary, or merely
gave a specific-and sometimes more narrow-structure to the
broad and amorphous fiduciary standards of section 10(b).
The notion that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is
broader than the Investment Company Act of 1940 is novel, to
say the least. 08 Yet that is the inescapable conclusion of a
107. Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1940) (testimony of Robert
E. Healy, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter cited as
1940 Hearings].
108. In this connection, see Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
en banc, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961):
The [Investment Company] Act regulates the entire investment
company industry. Congress sought to regulate that industry as comprehensively as the banking and insurance businesses are regulated. The Act
is pervasive in scope and detail. In addition, the Commission is given
broad power to promulgate rules, regulations and orders.
The Act is to be sharply contrasted with the much narrower Securities Act of 1933 and Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The 1933 and
1934 Acts articulated only a policy of disclosure and securities registration and the regulation of certain securities practices. On the other hand,
the 1940 Act placed the investment company business under close but
workable regulation.
194 F. Supp. at 217. The opinion continues:
In certain major respects, the 1940 Act operates as a corporation law for
investment companies. In sharp contrast, the 1934 Act (like the 1933 Act)
regulated one phase,-the purchase and sale of corporate securities. The
distinction is between commodity regulation and industry regulation.
The protective reach of the latter extends to the corporation as well as
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holding that rule 10b-5 covers breaches of fiduciary duty. The
contrast between the two acts in this regard is particularly
striking if one examines the two "catch-all" clauses-section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and section 36 of the Investment
Company Act.
Section 10(b) makes conduct in violation of Commission
rules "unlawful."10 Section 36, as originally drafted, would also
have made "unlawful" any "gross misconduct or gross abuse
of trust in respect of a registered investment company." '"10 Representatives of the investment company industry objected to
making such an "indefinite standard which was impossible of
determination" the basis of a criminal offense."' Accordingly,
while larceny and embezzlement remain crimes under the 1940
Act," ' section 36 as enacted merely authorized the Commission
to bring an action to remove from office any officer or director
engaged in a serious breach of fiduciary duty."3
It seems unlikely that Congress refused to make unenumerated breaches of fiduciary duty within a narrow class of
companies criminal in 1940, but did intend to make them criminal in 1934 in legislation affecting every corporation in the
country." 4
the stockholder and the public generally.
Id. at 232-33.
109. Criminal prosecutions under rule 10b-5 are rare, but do occur. See A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD
10.2, at 241 (1975); 3 L. Loss, SEcusrrIEs REGULATION
1449 n.15 (2d ed.1961). Precedents established in civil cases interpreting rule 10b-5 are
applicable in criminal prosecutions under the rule. United States v. Chamay, 537 F.2d
341, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976). See also SEC v.
Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943); United States v. Clark, 359 F. Supp. 128, 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). Thus, if Green and Marshel are correct, an intentional breach of
fiduciary duty in connection with the purchase or sale of a security is now criminal.
110. S. 3580, § 17(e), 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1940). It might be argued that the
two sections are not comparable, since a section 10(b) "breach of fiduciary duty" may
not be as serious as section 36's "gross misconduct or abuse of trust." However, given
the scienter requirement of Ernst & Ernst, (see note 82 supra) a breach of fiduciary
duty actionable under rule 10b-5 would seem necessarily to be actionable under section
36 if committed by an investment company manager. See, e.g., Moses v. Burgin, 445
F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971) (section 36 protects shareholders against self-dealing by managers); Brown v. Bullock, 197 F. Supp. 207, 238 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (section 36 is a
"reservoir of fiduciary obligations").
111. 1940 Hearings, supra note 107, at 124 (testimony of Alfred Jaretski, Jr.,
Sullivan & Cromwell).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (1970).
113. Id. § 80a-35 (1970) (Breach of Fiduciary Duty). In 1970, section 35 was
amended, changing "gross misconduct and gross abuse of trust" to "breach of fiduciary
duty involving personal misconduct." The Commission's powers remain limited to
injunctive relief and, in some cases, restitution.
114. Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), applies to private sales of unregis-
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THE RULE

Although the rule cannot be broader than the statute, and
the statute, as shown above, does not extend to breaches of
fiduciary duty beyond those related to disclosure and manipulation, it is still useful to examine the rule and the Commission's consistent administrative construction of its meaning.
Since everyone seems to be agreed that clause (2) of the
rule is limited to material misstatements and omissions, the
issue is the proper construction of the first and third clauses,
making it unlawful, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security: "(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud" or "(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person.""' 5
If the language of the rule is considered without regard to
the statute under which it was promulgated, "fraud" might
indeed include "equitable fraud"-breach of trust or overreaching. On the other hand, it is not necessary to interpret the
language that way in order to give the two clauses meaning. It
is fully consistent with the language of the rule to say that
clause (2) deals with verbal deceit, while clauses (1) and (3) are
aimed at deceptive conduct, including market manipulation
and, perhaps, total silence in the face of a duty to speak."'
Which interpretation is correct? Rule 10b-5 was lifted almost whole from section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933;1"
it was intended to afford to defrauded sellers the same protections granted by section 17(a) to buyers." ' It is therefore proper
to assume that the word "fraud" means the same in the rule
as it does in section 17(a).
Unfortunately, neither the House nor the Senate report on
tered securities as well as to market trading. Kardon v. National Gypsum, 73 F. Supp.
798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
115. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-5 (1976).
116. Thus, in Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), an
undisclosed scheme to reduce dividends in order to depress the market price of a
company's shares was held actionable, because although clause (b) "seems to require
a statement of some sort," clauses (a) and (c) do not. Id. at 243. See also O'Neill v.
Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1964) (deception may take the form of non-verbal
acts); cf. United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 350 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976) ("clauses (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 are not aimed
at failures to disclose. Rather they are flat prohibitions of deceitful practices and
market manipulations.").
117. The Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970). See Remarks of
Milton Freeman, Symposium, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities
Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967).
118. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
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the 1933 Act explains the meaning of that section. "' The House
Committee hearings on section 13, an earlier version of section
17(a), do provide some guidance, however. Section 13 made it
unlawful
for any person, firm, corporation, or other entity in any
interstate sale, promotion, negotiation, advertisement, or
distribution of any securities

. . .

willfully to employ any

device, scheme, or artifice to defraud or to obtain money
by means of any false pretense, representation or promise,
or to engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud upon the
purchaser."

Huston Thompson, one of the drafters of the bill, called
this "fraud clause" a "combination of, I would say, the Denison
bill and the Sabath bill:"' 2 '
[Section 13] incorporated the main feature of the Denison
bill so far as the committing of an act of fraud by way of
misrepresentationthrough the mails if the distribution or
sale of securities is concerned. . . .Then we had the Sabath bill . . .That was a fraud bill. We cover the subject

of fraud in this bill of ours. It had to do with the communication of false informationwith reference to securities, and
was somewhat like the Denison bill, although I do not believe it was limited to the question of the mails.'22
119. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1933); H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
120. H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
121. Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1933) (testimony of the Hon. Huston Thompson).
The Denison and Sabath bills were prior attempts to regulate securities offerings.
The Denison bill would have prohibited mail fraud in securities sales. Hearings on
H.R. 7215, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1921) (testimony of Edward E. Denison, Representative in Congress From the State of Illinois). Congressman Sabath introduced
three securities bills. Thompson apparently was referring to H.R. 4638, an act "to
prohibit communication of false information with respect to securities in certain
cases." Hearings on H.R. 4638 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1932).
122. Hearingson H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstateand Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933) (emphasis added). Mr. Thompson's testimony also contains a rather confusing exchange with Congressman Wolverton, who
expressed concern that the statute was not as protective as the state "blue sky" laws:
Mr. Wolverton: Then the theory upon which this bill is drawn is not to
prevent the issuance of worthless stock, but merely to give such facts as
will enable a purchaser to recognize it as worthless stock?
Mr. Thompson: I think that is pretty near it.
Mr. Wolverton: If there is a duty on the part of our Government to give
information to a purchaser that stock is worthless, why would it not be a
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Ollie Butler, another draftsman, also testified that section
13 "fraud" was disclosure-related:
[Sections 3 to 12] are based on the theory that proper
publicity will prevent the greater part of the fraudulent
transactions that have occurred during recent years ...
* * *Sections 13 and 14 are auxiliary to this main body
of the bill and were inserted for two reasons: First, because
it has been necessary to include exemptions from the main
body of the bill in order to facilitate normal and legitimate
business transactions. Every time that an exemption is
made to this main provision, it opens a way for evasion,
and it is almost impossible to insert an exemption without
duty of the Government to stop that stock from going out just as you
would stop any other fraud from being carried on?
Mr. Thompson: If you do that, you begin to get into the question of
what is speculative and what is not speculative, and that is a very difficult sphere to pick up.
Mr. Wolverton: Your answer makes plain to me the theory on which the
bill is drawn. Then there is no discretion, under the terms of the bill, in
the Federal Trade Commission to stop the issuance of any stock when the
issuer has complied with its provisions by giving the information required
by the terms of the act?
Mr. Thompson: That is as I understand the act; yes.
Mr. Wolverton: Is there not any general jurisdiction or power in the
Federal Trade Commission to stop unfairpractices?
Mr. Thompson: Yes; there is. But you have overlooked the fact that if
a fraud is committed there is a fraud section in this bill that I would like
to come back to. Let us get to that, because that is very important in line
with your question. Let us go back to section 13. . . Let us see. This man
has come in and complied with all the requirements of the bill, but really
he is putting out what you term a worthless stock and doing it in a
fraudulent way, let us say. [Mr. Thompson then read the language of the
section]. You say that that operates after the horse has been taken out
of the barn. Unless we are going into this question of analyzing each
security that comes up in passing upon whether it is a sound security or
not, that is all we can do with it.
Mr. Wolverton: Then it is your thought that we should not pass legislation that would require such action on the part of the Federal Trade
Commission?
Mr. Thompson: I do not believe we should.
Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added).
Messrs. Wolverton and Thompson appear to have been talking at cross-purposes.
Thompson's testimony appears to say that section 13 and its successor, section 17(a),
gave the FTC a residual discretionary power to pass upon "unfair practices" generally,
including evaluating the quality of a security after its issuance. Later in his testimony,
however, in response to a statement about speculative stocks by Congressman Pettengill that "if they tell the truth about it, that is as far as we intend to go, in principle,"
Thompson answered, "That is the understanding of this bill; that is the basis of this
bill. You are speaking now about the fraud section, are you not?" Pettengill replied
that he was speaking about the theory of the whole bill, but Thompson's response
clarifies his own position on section 13. Id. at 58.

19771

FRAUD WITHOUT DECEIT

it being used by the fraudulent promoter as a vehicle for
the evasion of the provision.
Therefore, Section 13, the fraud section, was added to
control those who managed to evade the main provision of
the law.'

On the specific question of directors' responsibilities and
conflicts-of-interest under the Act, Butler added: "This bill
does not attempt to regulate the internal operations of the
corporation . . . it does not attempt to reform corporation
24
law.''
Nor is the draftsmen's testimony the only indication of
what was intended. The language of section 17(a) echoes that
of the mail fraud statute, which outlaws the use of the mails
for "any scheme or artifice to defraud."'' 5 Just seven years
before the Securities Act was passed, the Supreme Court had
considered whether blackmail letters fell within the meaning of
that phrase. The Court held that coercion, however morally
objectionable, was not "fraud" because it did not involve trickery or deceit.'2 1 It seems reasonable to conclude that Congress
did not intend to give "fraud" a broader meaning in section
17(a) than it carries in a closely related statute.
Finally, section 17(a), like section 10(b), is a penal statute.
123. Id. at 116 (testimony of Ollie M. Butler).
124. Id. at 126.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
126. Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620 (1926). The Court thus rejected an
early version of the "helpless victim" argument. In reaching its conclusion, the Court
relied on an earlier decision construing the statute prohibiting conspiracies to defraud
the government (now 18 U.S.C. § 371). In that case, Hammerschmidt v. United States,
265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924), the Court had held that openly advocating violation of the
Selective Service Act was not fraud because it did not involve "deceit, craft or trickery."
Subsequent cases under the mail fraud statute have continued to state that active,
rather than constructive or equitable, fraud is necessary for a conviction under that
act. See, e.g., Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754, 765-66 (6th Cir. 1949):
Actual fraud has been defined as intentional fraud, consisting in deception intentionally practiced to induce another to part with property or
surrender some legal right, and which accomplished the end designed. . . . Constructive fraud is a breach of legal or equitable duty
which, in spite of the fact that there is no moral guilt resulting from the
breach of duty, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to
deceive others, to violate public or private confidence, or to injure public
interests.
Accord, Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 574, rehearing denied 314 U.S. 706 (1941) (but concealed bribery of a public
official is active fraud); Post v. United States, 407 F.2d 319, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1092 (1969) (but "deceitful violation of... fiduciary obligations" is
active fraud).
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It is helpful, in determining its meaning, to look at the broader
civil liability sections of the 1933 Act. As noted earlier, the
committee reports make it clear that the explicit federal fiduciary standards created under the 1933 Act are those of "full
and fair disclosure"' 27 and that the civil liabilities devised to
enforce those standards "attach only when there has been an
untrue statement of material fact or an omission to state a
material fact in the registration statement or the prospectus."'' 8 Had Congress intended to make fully disclosed, but
unfair, conduct subject to criminal sanctions under section
17(a), while specifically exempting such conduct from civil liability, it would presumably have said so.
"Fraud" in section 17(a), therefore, means "deception."
The rule which borrowed its language should not be read more
broadly.
In this connection, the Commission's administrative construction of the rule is also entitled to some weight. I have been
unable to find any case in which the Commission has challenged "unfair" but fully disclosed conduct under rule 10b-5.'2"
It is also significant, at least on the question of administrative
construction, that the Commission's proposed rules on "going
private," which contain "fairness" and "business purpose"
tests for such transactions, were promulgated under section
13(e) of the Act, not under section 10(b).'3 0
127. See note 103 supra.
128. H.R. REP. No. 1283, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
129. In fact, in connection with Marshel, the Commission staff's letter of comment on the Concord Fabrics proxy statement pointedly drew attention to the proposed "going private" rules and noted that the furnishing of comments did not constitute a determination on the fairness of the transaction. Marshel Appendix, supra note
12, at 121. Nevertheless, the Commission took no action against the merger.
Nor has the Commission taken such a position as amicus. The Commission did
not submit a brief in Green or Marshel in either the Second Circuit or the Supreme
Court. The Commission's amicus brief in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), urged the narrow "deception
of the shareholder" ground rather than the "controlling influence-unfairness" standard. The Commission was unable to agree on a position in Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d
714 (2d Cir. 1972), and therefore did not submit a brief at all.
130. The trial judge in Green stated that "[i]mplicit in the Commission's expressed intent to enact these or similar rules is the conclusion, which this court shares,
that existing rules, including Rule lob-5, do not reach the sort of acts here complained
of." Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Another
district court judge has recently noted that, when a rule is amended (or, presumably,
promulgated) to require something for the first time, after several years of study and
consideration, "there can be no contention that the amendment codifies a preexisting
implied duty rather than creates a new one." Rothstein v. Seidman & Seidman, 410
F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (alleged violation of a stock exchange rule).
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In short, both the history of the rule and its administrative
construction support the conclusion that the rule was not intended to reach claims of equitable fraud.' 3'
A POSTSCRIPT ON FAIRNESS

While Congress, unlike the Marshel and Green courts, has
not imposed federal "fairness" standards on all corporate fiduciaries, there is no doubt that it has the power to do so. Many
commentators have urged the adoption of federal fiduciary
duties, either through a program of minimum federal standards 3 ' or full federal incorporation. 33
It is not the purpose of this article to urge or combat one
course or the other. If, however, Congress decides to enact general corporate fiduciary standards,'34 it is to be hoped that it
will do so in terms more concrete than "fairness." Unlike motherhood and apple pie, both of which have their detractors, no
one is against fairness. Whether the universally approved abstraction is a helpful guide to courts or administrators is, however, a matter of some controversy.
For example, Professor Cary has noted that the Delaware
courts purport to follow a fairness standard but reach results
that do not seem to him to be fair at all. 5 The Investment
On the other hand, as the Supreme Court noted in SEC v. National Sec., Inc.,
393 U.S. 453 (1969), conduct may violate more than one section of the securities acts.
The promulgation of one of the proposed rules under section 13(e), therefore, would
not of itself establish that "going private" transactions which violate that rule are not
also unlawful under rule 10b-5.
131. Because the language and history of the statute and rule seem to me quite
clearly not to encompass fraud without deceit, this article does not discuss what the
majority opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737, 762
(1975), called the "policy" (and the dissent the "pragmaticality") of permitting such
actions. Suffice it to say that if the Supreme Court is concerned with the danger of
vexatious litigation which could result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs under
rule 10b-5, it will pause before deciding that the rule allows claims for any intentional
breach of fiduciary duty.
132. See, e.g., Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflections upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
133. See, e.g., Nader, The Case for Federal Chartering, in CORPORATE POWER IN
AMERICA 67 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973); Schwartz, FederalCharteringof Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEo. L.J. 71, 74-78 (1972).

134. The Senate Commerce Committee held hearings last year on various proposals for such legislation. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SEN. SER. No. 94-95, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).

135.

Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale

L.J. 663 (1974). See also Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 VA. L. REv. 1019

(1975) (a fairness standard is inappropriate in any event for "going private" transactions); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88
HARv. L. REV. 297 (1974) (criticism of the fairness standards usually applied).
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Company Act's mandate of fairness in investment company
mergers has produced two diametrically opposed federal opinions on the same transaction, and the Supreme Court will have
to resolve the issue.' Notably, a proposed requirement that a
securities offering be "fair, just and equitable" was omitted37
from the Uniform Securities Act because it was "too vague. ''
One federal judge has forcefully stated his view that
"fairness, equity, and fair dealing" make a bad judicial yardstick: "this standard is too thin a reed, too much like quicksand.' 3 "Quicksand" is, in this area, an appropriate metaphor. Congress, no less than the judiciary, should tread warily
when breaking new ground in a swamp.*
136. Compare Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101 (D.
Del. 1975) (net asset value is "fair") with Collins v. SEC, 532 F.2d 584 (8th Cir.), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 56 (1976) (No. 75-1872) (market value should be used).
137. National Ass'n of Securities Adm'rs Proceedings 73-76 (1951), criticized in
Comment, Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp: FraudulentMismanagementIndependent of Misrepresentationor Nondisclosure Violates Rule l1b-5, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 563,
575 (1975).
138. Remarks of Hon. Milton Pollack, An In-Depth Analysis of the Federaland
State Rules in Regulatory Corporate Management, 31 Bus. LAW. 939, 940 (1976).
* While this issue was being printed, the United States Supreme Court decided
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, No. 75-1753 (U.S., filed March 23, 1977). The Court
held that conduct which is neither deceptive nor manipulative does not violate section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or rule lob-5.

